Brady and "Cause"

So, thanks to the Second Circuit's opinion earlier in the day, Brady will sit after all (assuming no rehearing en banc and no grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court).  The situation is interesting as an object lesson in the employment context, as it shows how grey the situation can be when there is an accusation of wrongdoing against an employee, particularly one covered by an employment (or similar) contract.  Does the conduct rise to the level of "cause"?  What level of proof is necessary for action against the employee?  How much is an arbitrator's decision final and binding?  I would suggest viewing the Brady suspension/reversal/re-suspension* through the employment prism, as I think that in some sense it shows that, at the very least, certainty is often not the right by-word for disputes of this nature.

And, as a bit of a personal post-script, I just went to find where I posted my prediction right after the district court reversed Brady's Deflategate suspension, which prediction I had boldly stated to any number of people, that the Second Circuit would ultimately reverse the district court here.  It just always seemed obvious to me that, putting aside for a moment whether the NFL made the right substantive call in suspending him, the NFL did act within its contractual power in doing so.  However, to my great dismay, I never did the post.  So you'll just have to trust me that, in this case, I got one right (I'm entitled to get one right every 16 or so years).

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* Sounds like a description of the path for the DOL's fiduciary regulation.